One of the major impediments on the path to sustainable universal nuclear disarmament – meaning a world without nuclear weapons as well as the incentive to acquire them – is the persistent belief in the nuclear deterrence theory. This theory – which, in its most common form, claims that the threat of retaliation in kind will deter an opponent from carrying out a nuclear strike against you – was a cornerstone of the security mindset during the Cold War, yet continues to influence foreign and defence policies of nuclear weapon states, and such aspiring states, today.
Excellent efforts by academics, policy analysts and NGOs (with the support of some governments) have recently been undertaken to debunk the nuclear deterrence theory and as far as the present author is concerned, the reasoning displayed in these works is irrefutable and should convince anyone still in doubt of the uselessness of these instruments.[1] However, although there are hopeful signs that in some states the blind belief in nuclear deterrence is losing its grip on security thinking, in others the theory is still very much alive and kicking.
