Two
prisoners are brought into a precinct.
Separately, the individuals are approached by an attorney to negotiate a
‘deal’ for prison length. These
prisoners are presented with options: defect or cooperate. In defecting, prisoner A rats out
prisoner B. In cooperating,
prisoner A does not rat out prisoner B, in assumption (or hope) that prisoner B
will also cooperate. Prisoner B is
given mirrored options. The
payoffs depend on the option the prisoners choose. If prisoner A betrays B while B cooperates, prisoner A comes
out on top; if both prisoners cooperate, they both win- a mutual benefit; when
both rat out each other, both lose; and, when prisoner A cooperates, but B
betrays, prisoner A loses. If this
sounds familiar, it is because it is a popularized international relations (IR)
theory coined as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and stems from rational choice-Game
Theory in political science academia.
In recent, however, this dilemma has found scholarship in explaining
international law of treaties.
Because
there is no domineering international legislature or centralized lawmakers, it
remains very difficult to implement international law. Thus, treaties become monumental in
maintaining international harmony and cooperation. They can be thought of as an international public
service/good.
As
mentioned, treaties are designed to encourage international relations among
nations. Therefore, when nations
became signatory to a treaty (and upon ratification of a treaty), they make a
public commitment to abide by its rules/articles.
